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Abstract
Future electricity distribution grids will host a consid-
erable share of variable renewable energy sources and
local storage resources. Moreover, they will face new
load structures due for example to the growth of the
electric vehicle market. These trends raise the need
for new paradigms for distribution grids operation,
in which Distribution System Operators will increas-
ingly rely on demand side flexibility and households
will progressively become prosumers playing an ac-
tive role on smart grid energy management. However,
in present energy management architectures, the lack
of coordination among actors limits the capability of
the grid to enable the mentioned trends. In this paper
we tackle this problem by proposing an architecture
that enables households to autonomously exchange
energy blocks and flexibility services with neighbors,
operators and market actors. The solution is based
on a blockchain transactive platform. We focus on a
market application, where households can trade en-
ergy with their neighbors, aimed to locally balancing
renewable energy production. We propose a market
mechanism and dynamic transport prices that pro-
vide an incentive for households to locally manage
energy resources in a way that responds to both pro-
sumer and operator needs. We evaluate the impact
of such markets through comprehensive simulations
using power flow analysis and realistic load profiles,
providing valuable insight for the design of appropri-
ate mechanisms and incentives.
1 Introduction
Present electricity distribution grids were not de-
signed for facing massive deployment of renewable
energy sources (RES) on residential premises, nor for
the structural changes in load induced by the ex-
pected fast growth of the electric car market.
Two key consequences are, that the opportunities
rose by local RES as a major component of the energy
transition cannot be fully leveraged, and that, with
no architectural paradigm changes towards exploiting
demand side flexibility1, the required investments on
infrastructure reinforcement may be extremely high
[1].
In this paper we propose a novel cost effective ar-
chitecture that, on the one hand, enables households
to autonomously exchange energy blocks with their
neighbors in order to optimize their electricity bill,
and on the other hand, enables the Distribution Sys-
tem Operator (DSO) to induce a global behavior that
supports the stability of the network, by favoring the
balance of the excess of renewable energy with flexi-
1Ability to modify the electricity demand/supply profile.
1
ble demand at the neighborhood level.
The architecture relies on local energy markets, for
which we propose an auction mechanism in charge of
the efficient matching of households offers to buy and
sell renewable energy. We exploit dynamic transport
fee rebates for creating incentives for households to
adapt their demand of electricity to the availability of
local renewable energy production. Proposed mech-
anisms have the potential to alleviate congestion, re-
duce losses and consequently augment RES hosting
capacity.
To implement the market we propose a blockchain-
based transactive platform designed to enable the
trustworthy execution of transactions among actors,
thanks to increased security and transparency with
respect to a centralized auctioneer, leading to simpli-
fied and automated system audits[2].
We developed a proof of concept realization of the
proposed market mechanism, which allows us to eval-
uate the impact of local renewable energy markets
on distribution grid quality of supply through com-
prehensive simulations using power flow analysis and
realistic load profiles.
Previous work on the exchange of energy among
households has mainly focused on continuous double
auctions2 [3, 4], which are hard to implement over
a distributed platform that lacks fine-grained trans-
action arrival ordering, while call markets in which
orders are matched periodically[5, 6], are better
adapted and can also be more efficient[7]. Most arti-
cles taking into account the impact of such markets
on the distribution grid rely on locational marginal
pricing[8, 9] or message passing[10], which requires
specific knowledge on network topology and may pe-
nalize households depending on their location. There
is a recent trend towards local/micro markets for
the exchange of energy among households over dis-
tributed platforms. Our work is the first to propose
a thorough assessment of the impact of such markets
on distribution grid quality of supply.
Current blockchain-based approaches3 are still in
its infancy. They are not taking existing distribution
2Buying or selling offers are matched as they arrive in the
order of arrival.
3http://brooklynmicrogrid.com,
https://powerledger.io, http://solarcoin.org
grid needs into account, or they are trading renewable
certificates rather than balancing renewable energy
locally[11].
The main contributions of our work are the follow-
ing:
Section 2 - Local renewable energy balancing mar-
kets: We propose the transaction of energy among
households through a market aimed to locally balanc-
ing the excess of renewable energy production with
flexible demand in the context of future low voltage
distribution systems.
Section 3 - Transactive platform implementation:
We implement the market over a blockchain-based
transactive platform that provides increased security,
transparency and auditability with respect to central-
ized approaches.
Section 5 - Market mechanism and price incentives:
We propose an auction mechanism that is asymptoti-
cally efficient, truthful, weakly budget-balanced, and
fair in the attribution of quantities. Additionally, we
use simple transport fee rebates to incentive houses
to locally control their flexible demand in a way that
benefits both prosumer4 and DSO.
Section 7 - Distribution Grid impact assessment:
We thoroughly assess the impact of markets on dis-
tribution grid quality of supply. For this, we consider
a broad set of metrics (Section 4) and we provide a
simple but comprehensive model for the household
optimization problem (Section 6).
2 System description
The low voltage distribution grid under study con-
sists of one Medium Voltage/Low Voltage (MV/LV)
transformer and one or more feeders to which residen-
tial prosumers are connected5, as shown in Figure 1,
in a context with high deployment of Photovoltaic
Panels (PV) and rechargeable stationary batteries.
We consider houses with a PV panel and a battery,
houses with only a battery and houses without dis-
4Consumer evolution towards pro-active participation on
grid activities.
5This can also be seen as a Residential Virtual Distribution
Grid[12].
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Figure 1: Hierarchical architecture for distribution
grid energy management.
tributed energy resources6 (DER); all three types of
houses count on smart meters. Batteries represent
the main source of flexibility, as we consider inelastic
demand, so that there is no impact on comfort and
minimal user interaction is required. We also assume
the flows from the PV and to/from the battery can be
controlled by means of smart inverters . This enables
household to control the destination of the excess of
renewable energy as well as the source of the energy
that satisfies load demands.
Households interact with each other and with DSO,
suppliers and service providers on the low voltage dis-
tribution grid through a local energy transactive plat-
form to coordinate the access to DER. These actors
are represented by agents autonomously transacting
energy resources with each other in order to meet
their economic goals, while collaborating with local
and global grid infrastructure operation. Households
count on an energy management function (HEMS) for
optimizing the allocation of DER depending on pro-
sumer policies and economic incentives, and a Trad-
ing Agent function with the capability to exchange
resources over the transactive platform.
6Flexible loads, controllable generation and storage re-
sources.
2.1 Local renewable energy balancing
markets
This work focuses on renewable energy balancing
markets at the neighborhood level, where households
can exchange their excess/lack of energy. Based on
the forecasted gap between consumption and produc-
tion, the HEMS defines the energy available to trade
in order to minimize the electricity bill. Then, the
offers received from households’ Trading Agents are
matched by an auction algorithm that defines the ac-
cepted quantities to be exchanged and corresponding
prices.
In terms of time scales, we focus on intra-day ex-
changes for energy blocks corresponding to 10 min-
utes periods, which would enable to timely update
forecasts. Each market period will achieve finality
at least one hour ahead of the time for which the
resources are being allocated. This provides time
for market actors to adapt their wholesale market
offers, as the energy not balanced locally is pro-
vided/absorbed by utilities.
In order to evaluate the potential of proposed mar-
kets to augment variable RES hosting capacity, we
need to consider appropriate quality metrics (Section
4). In contrast with data networks, electricity is not
blocked or delayed by lack of capacity, as distribution
grids tend to have a relatively low utilization fac-
tor; while supporting high maximum flows increases
losses, reduces transformer and cable lifespan and can
cause voltage issues. For this reason, rather than fo-
cusing on capacity, we consider aggregated and max-
imum flows through the transformer, the peak to av-
erage ratio (PAR), and respective losses; while for the
lines we also analyze losses as well as voltage devia-
tions and network imbalance.
2.2 Prices and auto-consumption
In coherence with a context of massive deployment of
RES, we assume that parity has been achieved, i.e.:
electricity prices are higher than the Levelized Cost
of Electricity (LCOE) produced by the PV. We con-
sider the Feed In Tariff (FIT)7 to be lower than elec-
7Regulated price that utilities must pay to prosumers for
the renewable energy they inject into the grid.
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tricity prices, leaving a gap that can be exploited to
establish a market for the exchange of energy among
households. In this context, we assume houses will
always prefer to auto-consume the energy available
from their PV. Then, in cases of excess of production
(resp. demand), households would have the following
options for the surplus (resp. lack) of energy: they
can charge (resp. discharge) their battery, inject on
the grid for the FIT (resp. buy it from the utility) or
sell (resp. buy) on the local renewable market.
Considering low FIT has two main motivations,
first the reduction on LCOE from PV and the related
increase in their deployment, and second, the need
to incentive injection of renewable energy only when
provides value to the grid. We propose that the gap
between current FIT8 and the FIT assumed by this
work, could be used as an extra incentive for locally
balancing renewable energy. Thus, only the energy
that is certified to be balanced locally (thanks to the
market) gets the extra feed in rewards; simultane-
ously motivating agents to enforce their contracted
quantities through the local market. Furthermore,
compared to current FIT, our approach not only ben-
efits those who invest in PV, but also those who pro-
vide the flexibility necessary to host RES. Neverthe-
less, this incentive is not enough to take into account
the needs of the DSO, as dynamic incentives need to
be provided for households to charge their batteries
when there is local renewable energy available. Such
incentives will be proposed in Section 5.
3 Transactive platform imple-
mentation
Creating distributed transactive applications for the
secure and transparent exchange of assets over a
shared infrastructure formed by a network of com-
peting parties has recently become feasible thanks to
blockchain technology.
The network is composed of validator nodes,
for instance implemented by operators and service
8Current FIT values in France are around 3 times the price
of electricity, regardless of the suitability of the injection for
the distribution grid.
Figure 2: Blockchain-based transactive platform and
market implementation.
providers, in charge of forwarding and processing
transactions into blocks, and validating the addition
of new transaction blocks on a shared ledger. This
shared ledger works like a replicated state machine, in
which a new block represents a distributed agreement
on its next state. The ledger can host code in the
form of a smart contract[2] , which is executed each
time a transaction gets addressed to it. This behav-
ior is replicated across validator nodes, and allows the
system to process transactions securely and reliably
even in the presence of malicious nodes (Byzantine
fault tolerance).
We use blockchain technology to build a chain
of ownership over energy resources, i.e.: en-
ergy/flexibility units, so these can be traded in ad-
vance, in exchange of money in the form of a token
payment. The parties involved in a transaction also
receive the extra FIT reward as described in Section
2.2, as long as the enforcement of the corresponding
electricity flows is validated by DSO9. Such rewards
are made through a token we call ECOin, represent-
ing a certificate of green energy traded locally, which
can have many applications related to energy effi-
ciency or CO2 emission reductions.
We used networks of Smart Contracts to im-
plement each aspect of the market as exemplified
on Figure 2, including registries (Renewable energy
registry), matching offers (through implementation
of auction mechanisms), clearing and settlement of
9Such verification could be automatically done by smart
meters.
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transactions (verification of flows and attribution of
ECOins). The Monax platform was used to create
the network of validator nodes, which achieve dis-
tributed agreement thanks to the Tendermint Byzan-
tine Fault Tolerance algorithm[2]. Monax provides
also the tools to deploy smart contracts and Node.js
libraries that were used for the Trading Agents to
interact with the network of validators.
In addition to the local balancing markets, the dis-
tributed nature of blockchain-based markets will en-
able any aggregator or supplier to offer complemen-
tary demand response services. For instance, the de-
ployment of bi-level optimization mechanisms consid-
ering competing aggregators, such as in [13], could be
done through smart contracts enabling prosumers to
transact their flexibility without the need of having
a previously signed legal contract. Furthermore, the
shared transaction history could be used as a source
of reputation of the different service providers as well
as of the prosumers.
4 Metrics for evaluating mar-
ket impact
In this section we describe the quality metrics con-
sidered for the evaluation of the proposed renewable
energy balancing market. We consider periods of
24 hours, slotted in timeslots of 10 minutes dura-
tion, t ∈ T = 1, ..., T , where T = 144 is the total
amount of timeslots. Let Pin,t be the power flow-
ing through the transformer from MV towards LV at
timeslot t, expressed as Pin,t =
∑
phmax(P
P
ph,t, 0),
where PPph,t is the power on the primary windings
for phase ph, and Pout,t =
∑
phmax(−P
S
ph,t, 0) the
flow from LV to MV, where PSph,t is the power on the
secondary windings. The total power traversing the
transformer is given by Pabs,t = Pin,t + Pout,t. Given
the flows through the transformer we define corre-
sponding losses as follows:
Trloss =
∑
t(Pabs,t(CL + CC)) (1a)
Lloss =
∑
l,ph,tRl,phI
2
l,ph,t (1b)
where CL and CC are the coefficients representing
leakage inductance losses and copper losses due to
currents flowing through transformer windings, re-
spectively. On the line losses, Rl,ph is the resistance
of the phase ph of section l of the distribution lines,
and Il,ph,t the corresponding current.
With respect to the peak of power through the
transformer:
Pmax = max(Pabs,t) (2a)
PAR = T Pmax∑
t
Pabs,t
(2b)
RES hosting capacity is affected also by voltage
issues such as maximal deviations of voltage from its
nominal value as well as network imbalance. The
nominal value VU and the voltage deviation V
ph
delta
for each phase ph are defined as follows, with V phL2N
being the line to neutral voltage:
VU =
410√
3
(3a)
V phdelta = 100
|V ph
L2N
|−VU
VU
(3b)
V UF = 100 |V2||V1| (3c)
Where V1 and V2 are the positive and negative volt-
age as per the symmetrical components method for
unbalanced power systems and V UF is the Voltage
Unbalance Factor.
5 Market mechanism
The role of a market mechanism is to determine the fi-
nal quantities and prices traded by each participant,
by matching their orders. The exchange of energy
blocks among trading agents will be carried out in
a call market, through a Multi-unit Double Auction
(MDA) mechanism[7], where agents submit a bid or
ask order, which are respectively the maximum, or
minimum, price the agent is willing to pay to buy,
or to accept to sell, the corresponding units of en-
ergy on certain timeslot. We propose a discrete-time
MDA mechanism based on the algorithm proposed
in[14], a variation of which has already been used for
energy allocation markets in the context of electric
vehicle charging[15] and complies with certain inter-
esting characteristics:
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• Strategy-proof with respect to reservation price -
Each agent’s optimal strategy is to reveal truth-
ful information regardless of other agents ac-
tions.
• Weakly budget-balanced - All payments between
buyers and sellers sum to a positive value, which
is used to reward the nodes that process the
transactions.
• Individually rational - The market encourages
participation by ensuring non-negative profits.
• Asymptotically efficient - The market becomes
more efficient with the increasing amount of par-
ticipants, maximizing total profit obtained by all
participants.
The market will work on daily periods with one
round to decide for each 10 minute timeslot, during
which the offers are considered static. For any given
round, each buyer i submits a bid for vbi units at a
reservation price of pbi and each seller j an ask for
vaj units at p
a
j . The mechanism first generates the
demand/supply curve, which sorts bids and asks in
decreasing and increasing order of their reservation
price, respectively. Then a buyer B and a seller S
are identified at the critical point where the aggre-
gate demand and supply meet. In order to make
the mechanism strategy proof[14] the corresponding
houses do not participate in the trade, as well as the
offers with index over B and S. As a consequence of
eliminating the critical offers, there are two cases for
attributing quantities.
Let the aggregated volumes of participating bids
and asks be VB =
∑B−1
1
vbi and VS =
∑S−1
1
vaj re-
spectively, then if VB ≥ VS , all sellers with index
j < S trade their volume vaj at price p
a
S , while all
buyers with index i < B trade at price pbB a volume
equal to vbi
VS
VB
; else if VS ≥ VB , then all buyers with
index i < B trade their volume vbi at price p
b
B, while
all sellers with index j < S will trade at price paS
a volume equal to vaj
VB
VS
. This is as efficient as in
[14], but is fairer on the individual attributions, from
which the burden |VB−VS | is subtracted proportion-
ally to the offer rather than uniformly.
Price incentives
In addition to the extra FIT reward proposed in Sec-
tion 2.210, a dynamic incentive needs to be considered
to synchronize battery charging with locally available
renewable power. We propose the form of the incen-
tive to be a rebate on the distribution/transport fee
for those who buy electricity from the local market, as
every wh exchanged through the market is assumed
not to traverse the transformer. We propose the value
to be proportional to the day-ahead forecast of the
average renewable energy production of a house on
the neighborhood. Let rm be the maximum rebate
considered, pu = pu1 , ..., p
u
T to be the utility prices for
the day, and gˆn = gˆn1 , ..., gˆ
n
T be the forecast for the
average renewable production, where the values are
normalized so that gˆnt ≤ 1 ∀t. Then the minimum
reservation price for each house at timeslot t would
be prt = p
u
t − gˆ
n
t r
m rather than put , which means that
houses can potentially win more by making bids to
charge their batteries when there is more renewable
energy available.
6 Households problem defini-
tion
We consider a hierarchical architecture where the
control on the distribution grid level, based on mar-
ket mechanisms as explained above, can be de-
signed independently from the control mechanisms
inside the households, which is a benefit with re-
spect to more tightly coupled models such as bi-level
optimization[13]. For illustrating the feasibility of
our approach11, a simple model of the problems that
need to be solved by the HEMS is described. For
the purpose of this article we consider a determin-
istic scenario in which consumption and production
curves are known in advance12. This simplifying as-
sumption relies on the capacity of batteries to absorb
forecasting errors, particularly if forecasts were zero
10The analysis and simulations do not consider the extra
FIT incentive.
11For a business model analysis (out of the scope of this
paper) see [1].
12We do not address any particular forecasting mecha-
nism/technology.
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mean biased, and on the possibility of establishing
similar market mechanisms closer to real time.
6.1 Determine offer quantities
Let h ∈ H = {0, ..., 23} denote the next hour for
which the local renewable energy market will accept
offers. The HEMS needs to find optimal offer quanti-
ties vˆot0+1, ..., vˆ
o
t0+6
, where t0 = 6h is the base timeslot
of the hour h for 6 timeslots per hour. The energy
units to offer on the market depend on the optimal
use of the battery. The amount of energy stored
on the battery at the end of the timeslot t is rep-
resented by et and its evolution in time is given by
et = et−1 − st, where st represents the amount of en-
ergy charged or discharged to/from the battery dur-
ing timeslot t. We require batteries to regain the ini-
tial state of charge at the end of the period eT = e0,
so as to each study be independent, and also not to
exceed one entire charge/discharge cycle of maximum
80% depth of discharge per day, to extend battery
life.
To satisfy such battery constraints, the HEMS
needs to optimize over a rolling window formed by
timeslots t ∈ Th = {t0 + 1, .., 144}, with τh = |Th|.
Each household has a (perfect) forecast of consump-
tion ℓh,t and production gh,t for the rest of the day,
from which it determines the gap dh,t = ℓh,t − gh,t
that needs to be obtained by charging/discharging
the battery or buying/selling on the local market.
Households have the incentive to offer on the local
market all the energy that is not exchanged with the
battery, as they pay at most their bid limit price pbh,t
when buying and receive at least their ask limit price
pah,t when selling.
Then, each household will look at the rest of the
day and determine the best way of using the battery
in order to minimize the electricity bill, depending on
their limit prices and assuming that all the offers will
be accepted. For each hour h the HEMS will solve
the following linear program:
argmin
xh
aThxh ah ∈ ℜ
3τh , xh ∈ ℜ
3τh
(4a)
s.t.
x1,t + x2,t + x3,t = dh,t ∀ t ∈ Th
(4b)
− eh0 ≤ −
∑j=t
j=t0+1
x3,j ≤ E − eh0 ∀ t ∈ Th
(4c)
− Cu ≤ x1,t ≤ 0 ∀ t ∈ Th
(4d)
0 ≤ x2,t ≤ C
u ∀ t ∈ Th
(4e)
|x3,t| ≤ C
s ∀ t ∈ Th
(4f)
where eh0 is the accumulated energy on the battery
up to hour h and Cu and Cs are the maximum
power that can be exchanged on one timeslot with
the grid and with the battery respectively. Variables
xh,t = (x1,t, x2,t, x3,t)
T and deterministic coefficients
ah,t = (a1,t, a2,t, a3,t)
T are as follows:
x1,t : vˆ
a
h,t Energy to sell on local market
(5a)
a1,t =
{
pah,t,
0,
if gh,t > ℓh,t,
else,
x2,t : vˆ
b
h,t Energy to buy on local market
(5b)
a2,t = p
b
h,t
x3,t : sh,t Energy flow with the battery
(5c)
a3,t = 0
With the solution we obtain the vector of offers
vˆoh = vˆ
a
h+ vˆ
b
h from which only the first 6 values corre-
sponding to the next hour will be sent to the trading
agent.
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6.2 Determine final flows
Once the market results for each timeslot of the next
hour h are obtained by the trading agent, the HEMS
needs to re-run the optimization problem in order to
obtain the desired set point for the battery, as well
as the flows to exchange with the utility, i.e.: the
energy that is not exchanged with the battery will be
sold for the FIT or bought from the supplier. The
structure of the optimization problem is the same,
except that the finally traded quantities voh = v
a
h+v
b
h
are taken as an input and define the new gap to be
satisfied dh,t = ℓh,t−gh,t−v
o
h,t, and the optimization
variables and parameters are as follows:
x1,t : g
FIT
h,t Energy to sell for the FIT (6a)
a1,t =
{
FIT,
0,
if gh,t > ℓh,t,
else,
x2,t : ℓ
u
h,t Energy to buy from supplier u
(6b)
a2,t = p
u
h,t Price offered by supplier u
x3,t : sh,t Energy flow with the battery
(6c)
a3,t = 0
7 Simulations and Results
7.1 Simulation tools, procedure and
assumptions
We use power flow analysis as the means to assess the
impact of the exchange of energy among households
on quality of supply over the distribution grid. We
rely on the Distribution Network Simulation Plat-
form (DisNetSimPl) developed by EDF R&D. The
platform provides an interface to several simulation
tools, from which we use the open source Distribu-
tion System Simulator OpenDSS. For illustrative pur-
poses we designed an electricity network model con-
formed by a 20 kV/410 V transformer of 160 kVA
rated power, two feeders with aluminum power lines
of 240mm2 and neutral of 95mm2, following general
specifications for French distribution grids 1314. The
experiments were based on realistic synthetic con-
sumption data obtained from the Multi-agent Sim-
ulator of Human Behavior SMACH[16]. The load
curves correspond to 6 winter days of consumption
from 33 households of mixed profiles. We requested
data for intervals of 10 minutes in order to be able to
simulate the system we define in Section 2.1.
The daily load served as an input to the individual
household control mechanism; more precisely as the
consumption forecast of each household. After each
intraday decision taken and the corresponding mar-
ket interactions, the flows to be exchanged with the
battery and to be transacted with the neighbors are
calculated. The final load curve exchanged with the
grid for each household is used as an input for the
DisNetSimPl simulator to analyze the impact of the
market on the distribution grid.
For the simulations we considered N = 33 house-
holds, 8 without flexibility (approx N/4), 8 with bat-
tery only (approx N/4) and 17 with PV and battery
(approx N/2). We consider ideal batteries (without
losses) of sizes, 3, 6 and 9 kWh. We consider a com-
mon supplier offering a Time Of Use pricing with
two levels: 15 cAC/kWh from 12 am to 4 pm and 30
cAC/kWh from 5 pm to 11 pm15. The reserve prices of
houses are randomly obtained from a uniform distri-
bution with values ranging from 0 to 30% improve-
ment over alternative prices from the utility, while
the price rebate is below 2 cAC/kWh.
7.2 Results and discussion
Results are presented as the percentage enhancement
on the metrics introduced in Section 4 with respect to
the scenario without market16. The results are shown
for 6 days (where the only change on the simulation
are the base load curves on every household) and for
several battery sizes. For each simulation batteries
in all households have the same size.
13http://www.enedis.fr/sites/default/files/Enedis-PRO-RES_43E.pdf
14Network file available at
https://github.com/joluHo/P2P-energy-trading
15The usual peak price at midday does not fit the context of
this work.
16Results are also applicable to centralized auctioneer im-
plementations.
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(a) Energy out. (b) Energy in.
Figure 3: Energy through the transformer.
(a) Transformer losses. (b) Line losses.
Figure 4: Reduction of losses.
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Figure 3a shows that a market enabling the ex-
change of energy among households coupled with ap-
propriate incentives enables considerable reductions
on the excess of renewable energy production towards
Medium Voltage. The non-decreasing dependency
with the size of the battery is coherent with the in-
crease in flexibility available for households, and it is
maintained despite variations on residential demand
in different days, with a lower impact on days 1 and 5
due to a lower aggregated demand on the peak hours.
For the understanding of the behavior of the system
it is interesting to note that, as the size of batteries
increase, the excess of energy in houses with PV is
reduced and the offers to sell on the market as well.
This can also be explained by the fact that when the
units per bid is increased and the units per asks is de-
creased, the amount of bidders participating on the
market can potentially be reduced, creating a neg-
ative impact on the efficiency of the strategy proof
market mechanism.
There is also a consistent reduction on the energy
entering the transformer from the Medium Voltage,
though the reduction is less considerable as it repre-
sents a small share of the total demand. The total
reduction of flow through the transformer leads to a
reduction on transformer losses close to 4% for 6 and
9 kWh batteries, as we can see on Figure 4a. The
total line losses are also reduced as shown in Figure
4b.
We can see, in Figure 5a, that the market consis-
tently achieves a reduction of losses in line phases.
This is not the case for the neutral as shown in Fig-
ure 5b. The market mechanism does not take into
account the phases when allocating the quantities to
be traded, leading to production on one phase being
balanced with consumption in another phase. These
unequal flows on the phases unbalance the network
provoking an increase on the neutral current and re-
spective losses.
The unbalance effect of the market is reflected
by an important increase on the maximum VUF as
shown in Figure 6. From the overall results of our
analysis it is understood that the only negative im-
pact of such imbalance would be on triphasic loads
connected to the network. We are working on new
market designs to cope with this issue.
Figure 7a shows that the peak load supported by
the transformer is consistently and considerably re-
duced. The PAR is in some cases increased, due to
a more important reduction on the mean load, which
is also positive for the grid.
In current distribution networks voltage deviations
depend on how loads are connected to the different
phases and varies on time due to the load evolution
of the different households. We observe that our sys-
tem for some phases has positive impacts on voltage
deviation, as shown in Figures 8a and 8b, but si-
multaneously in other phase the impact can be neg-
ative. Nevertheless, in all cases the operation lim-
its are respected. Control on individual line current
limits or voltage deviations require additional mech-
anisms that are not considered in this paper. These
are subject of future work, as they can function in
parallel with the renewable energy market (as sug-
gested at the end of Section 3), or at a time scale
closer to real-time.
8 Conclusion
Major ongoing evolutions in the electricity industry,
like local deployment of RES and storage capacity,
represent a key driver for the “energy transition” and
related objectives. Nevertheless, the required trans-
formations of the distribution grid are today delaying,
and in some cases blocking, the possibility to leverage
such opportunities. In this work we propose increas-
ing RES hosting capacity by introducing autonomous
markets for the exchange of energy among households
aimed to locally balancing renewable energy produc-
tion. The proposed system is based on auction mech-
anisms and dynamic transport fee rebates that serve
as an incentive for households to control their energy
resources in a way that benefits both prosumer and
operator. The architecture relies on a blockchain-
based transactive platform to enable the coordinated
participation of any type of player, including DSOs,
aggregators, and prosumers, thanks to its increased
security, transparency and auditability with respect
to centralized implementations.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first
to propose a thorough assessment of the impact of
10
(a) On phases. (b) On neutral.
Figure 5: Reduction of line losses.
(a) Maximum VUF. (b) Mean VUF.
Figure 6: Voltage Unbalance Factor.
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(a) Maximum transformer load. (b) PAR.
Figure 7: Grid congestion assessment.
(a) Maximum deviation. (b) Mean deviation.
Figure 8: Voltage profile deviation.
12
the exchange of energy among households on distri-
bution grid quality of supply, for which we use power
flow simulations with realistic load data. The re-
sults show that the auction mechanism and price in-
centives proposed on this paper enable an increase
of RES hosting capacity by reducing the maximum
power flowing through the transformer and reducing
losses on both the transformer and the lines. More-
over, the fact of locally balancing the excess of PV
production reduces the possible negative impacts of
massive PV deployment on the global grid. Addi-
tional benefits could be obtained if the mechanisms
could reduce voltage deviation and network unbal-
ance. An approach for coping with these issues could
be enabling DSOs to actively provide incentives and
constraints for the operation of DER. We are cur-
rently working on game theory models for establish-
ing distributed mechanisms that enable households to
determine optimal strategies for reducing their elec-
tricity bill, leading to a competitive aggregative equi-
librium that respects, in particular, such distribution
grid constraints. Moreover, our current work will ex-
tend simulations to scenarios with more houses and
different penetration of resources, and will assess the
impact of forecast uncertainty on the obtained re-
sults.
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